Bay Of Pigs 10 Pages Essay Research free essay sample

Bay Of Pigs ( 10 Pages ) Essay, Research Paper B A Y O F P I G S The narrative of the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, which is located on the south seashore of Cuba about 97 stat mis south-east of Havanna, was one of misdirection, hapless judgement, and stupidity ( ? Bay of Pigs? 378 ) . The incrimination for the failed invasion falls straight on the CIA ( Central Intelligence Agency ) and a immature president by the name of John F. Kennedy. The whole purpose of the invasion was to assault communist Cuba and put an terminal to Fidel Castro. Ironically, 39 old ages after the Bay of Pigs, Fidel Castro is still in power. First, it is necessary to look at why the invasion happened and so why it did non work. From the terminal of World War II until the eightiess, most Americans could hold that communism was the enemy. Communism wanted to destruct our manner of life and pervert the freest state in the universe. Communism is an economic system in which one individual or a group of people are in control. The chief intent of communism is to do the societal and economic position of all persons the same. It abolishes the inequalities in ownership of belongings and distributes wealth every bit to all. The chief job with this is that one individual who is really affluent can be stripped of most of his wealth so that another individual can hold more material goods and be his equal. The chief ground for the Bay of Pigs onslaught on Cuba was the alteration to communism. On January 1, 1959, Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista fled the state for the safety of the Dominican Republic ( Goode, Stephen 75 ) . Fidel Castro and his guerilla warriors overthrew the old authorities dictated by Batista. During the following twosome of hebdomads, Castro established a new authorities and on February 16, he was officially declared Prime Minister ( Finkelstein, Norman H. 127 ) . The United States accepted this new government as a alleviation from the harsh, corrupt, and unpopular authorities of Batista. Soon after everything settled down, Castro and his work forces made a rapid move to alter their political class. He announced his transmutation to Marxism-Leninism and avowed his friendly relationship with the Soviet Union ( Goode, Stephen 75 ) . These events upset the United States and there were concerns about Castro going excessively powerful. One ground was the friendly relationship with the Soviet Union because Cuba was having armed forces to spread out and better its ground forces. Cuba received 30,000 dozenss of weaponries a twelvemonth, which included Soviet JS-2 51-ton armored combat vehicles, SU-100 assault guns, T-34 35-ton armored combat vehicles, 76-mm field guns, 85-mm field guns, and 122-mm field guns ( Goode, Stephen 75 A ; 76 ) . Fidel Castro took great pride in the armed forces. He expanded the land forces from 250,000 to 400,000 military personnels. These figures put one out of every 30 Cubans in the armed forces, compared to one out of every 60 Americans ( Goode, Stephen 76 ) . Castro and communist Cuba was bring forthing a military constitution ten times larger than that of Batista? s. Castro put together the best ground forces any Latin American state had of all time had ( Goode, Stephen 76 ) . Analysts in Washington were frightened by this intelligence. They were acquiring scared that Cuba might seek to assail the United States with Soviet missiles and missile launchers. Besides, they were afraid that Castro might assail other Latin American states. Both scenarios were non welcome in the United States, and the ruin of Castro and the Cuban authorities became the top precedence of the CIA ( Goode, Stephen 76 ) . There were many Cubans that did non like Castro. They flocked to the United States in order to get away communism. These people were known as Cuban expatriates ( Goode, Stephen 76 ) . On March 17, 1960, the CIA and President Eisenhower got together and discussed the state of affairs traveling on in Cuba. They decided to build up and develop these Cuban expatriates for guerilla warfare against Cuba ( Goode, Stephen 76 A ; 77 ) . In November 1960, John F. Kennedy was elected president. Upon his election, he was informed of the Cuban crisis and after being presented with the facts, he approved the invasion. Many programs for the invasion were recognized, but the best one came from Richard Bissel. He describes his program in a book entitled, CIA. ? The program that was eventually accepted was a more complex and larger version of the operation seven old ages earlier in Guatemala. A force of Cuban expatriates was to procure a beachhead on Cuba? s coastline while a fleet of B-26? s, the most powerful war contending plane, was to set Castro? s air force out of committee and interrupt transit and communicating lines ( Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali 95 ) . Once the beachhead had been secured and a part of Cuban district liberated, a group of Cuban expatriate leaders would be flown to Cuba to organize a probationary authorities. The United States would so officially acknowledge the probationary authorities as the one true authorities of Cuba? ( Goode, Stephen 77 ) . The invasion started on April 16, 1961. It lasted for about three yearss. At the beginning, the CIA purchased several farms in Florida where the Cuban expatriates could get down preparation ( Goode, Stephen 77 A ; 78 ) . Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua helped the invasion because they gave their blessing for CIA cantonments to be located in these parts ( Goode, Stephen 78 ) . The Nicaraguan? s dictator, Anastasio Somoca, disliked Castro enormously. He said, ? Bring me back a twosome of hairs from Castro? s face fungus? ( Robinson, Linda 53 ) . The invasion, which was code-named Operation Zapata, consisted of about 1,400 to 1,500 expatriates ( Bay of Pigs Revisited, The 3 ) . The CIA chose Manuel Artime Buesa as the leader of the military personnels ( Goode, Stephen 79 ) . He was a former Castro soldier and his leading abilities were said to be first-class. His first move as leader was to acquire rid of all he suspected disloyal or unqualified. Following, he replaced many of the functionaries that had been developing with the soldiers in Latin American states with officers who had served in Fulgencio Batista? s ground forces. These officers were said to be? hoods? who had been portion of the former dictator? s barbarous authorities ( Goode, Stephen 79 ) . President Kennedy ordered that there be none of Batista? s work forces in the Liberation Army, which was the ground forces doing the invasion, but these orders seemed to be ignored. About 200 of the expatriates did non like Artime? s move to name Batista? s work forces as caputs of the Army. These work forces were given a pick either to accept the functionaries or non accept it and be flown to Guatemala to remain at that place until the invasion was completed ( Goode, Stephen 79 ) . Six months before the invasion, the United States did a foolish thing. Ra? cubic decimeter Roa, the Cuban foreign curate, stated in an interview at the United Nations, ? I have accurate cognition of the invasion? . He told them that he knew about the expatriates and their preparation in Guatemala, and he knew that the CIA was in charge of the onslaught. Roa claimed that he got the information from LIFE magazine, the New York Daily News, and CBS ( Goode, Stephen 79 A ; 80 ) . Besides Roa, Castro besides acquired accurate and utile information. He was really prepared for the invasion. Castro camouflaged the little Cuban air force, and he invariably patrolled possible invasion sites he heard were traveling to be targeted, including the Bay of Pigs. The forenoon before the invasion, April 15, 1961, he ordered a countrywide qui vive ( Goode, Stephen 80 ) . On April 14, 1961, the Liberation Army set canvas on six ships from Nicaragua. The Army consisted of about 1,500 military personnels and they had about five armored combat vehicles, 18 howitzers, 15 recoilless rifles, four flame-throwers, 12 projectile launchers, twelve set downing trades, and five bottoms to make conflict with ( Robinson, Linda 54 ) . The following twenty-four hours, the first work stoppage was made on Cuba. The work stoppage was good for the Army because it destroyed at least half of Castro? s planes, including B-26? s, Sea Furies, and T-33 jet trainers ( Goode, Stephen 80 ) . This was an early onslaught on Cuba, and Castro was non ready for this assault ; hence, ensuing in the devastation of half of Castro? s planes. On April 16, the probationary authorities members received word that the invasion was nigh. They flew to Miami where they would conceal out, and be ready to be taken to Cuba if the invasion was successful ( Goode, Stephen 80 A ; 81 ) . The following thing the president did was really polar to the success of the onslaught. President Kennedy canceled a 2nd scheduled air work stoppage against Cuba. No one truly cognize why he canceled the work stoppage ; nevertheless, he could hold believed the first work stoppage did equal harm to the Cuban air force and a 2nd would non be needed ( Bay of Pigs Revisited, The 4 ) . In any instance, the cancellation was considered by the CIA to harm the operation and possibly condemn it to failure ( Nelson, Craig 1 ) . At midnight on April 16, the invasion began ( Goode, Stephen 81 ) . Thingss got away to a bad start. The coral reefs delayed several landing trades and others experienced engine problem. Some of the expatriates chose a land invasion. These military personnels penetrated about 20 stat mis into Cuba until they ran into Castro? s reserves. The reserves had heavy supports which meant a quicker resignation for these expatriates ( Goode, Stephen 81 ) . On Monday, April 17, the staying planes of Castro? s air force were able to enforce great harm on the ships and their encroachers ( Bay of Pigs Revisited, The 4 ) . Two of the Liberation Army? s ships were sunk, The Houston and The Rio Candido, which sank with most of the Army? s ammo, oil, communications equipment, and work forces. Three of the B-26? s that the Liberation Army had were shot down by Cuba? s 20-mm cannons ( Goode, Stephen 81 ) . Later on that awful Monday, President Kennedy approved a 2nd air work stoppage, but it came excessively late. The exile force had been exhaustively defeated. When the planes arrived, they were an hr tardily because of the difference in clip zones ( Goode, Stephen 81 A ; 82 ) . Of the 1,500 military personnels the ground forces had at first, merely 1,297 made it to Cuba. The others were killed at sea or deserted. After the Liberation Army surrendered, 1,180 of the 1,297 were captured and taken as captives to Havanna ( Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali 95 ) . Most of the captured expatriates confessed their connexion with the CIA and radius of support from the United States ( Goode, Stephen 82 ) . Castro was really angry with the United States and he told other states the dangers that existed with the United States. Representatives spoke with Castro and came to a via media. The United States wanted the captives back, and Castro needed medical supplies. They negotiated and Castro released the captives to return to Florida in clip for Christmas, 1962 ( Goode, Stephen 82 ) . On April 19, one twenty-four hours after the failure of the invasion, Castro announced over the wireless, ? The encroachers have been annihilated. The Revolution has emerged winning. It destroyed in less than seventy-two hours the ground forces organized during many months by the imperialist authorities of the United States? ( Goode, Stephen 82 ) . Many people believed that Kennedy was the cause of the failure. CIA functionaries and Cuban exiles believed Kennedy? s failure to O.K. air work stoppages to endorse up the seaborne encroachers doomed the program ( Nelson, Craig 1 ) . President Kennedy publically shouldered the duty, but in private he blamed the CIA and his military advisors. He besides said that the bureau needed reorganisation ( Goode, Stephen 82 ) . Although some CIA functionaries blamed the president, legion others blamed the bureau every bit good. The CIA manager, Allen Dulles, resigned several months after the invasion. He was replaced by John McCone, a prominent man of affairs ( Finkelstein, Norman H. 134 ) . Many other CIA functionaries either quit or were fired by President Kennedy. Lyman Kirkpatrick, the CIA inspector general, wrote a study. He is said to be one of the harshest reviews of the invasion ( Nelson, Craig 1 ) . Kirkpatrick laid most of the incrimination straight on the CIA. Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, and others resented the study and said that he had betrayed the CIA ( Goode, Stephen 83 ) . The 150-page study was eventually released after sitting in the CIA manager? s safe for over 30 old ages. Some extracts of the study were released on February 21, 1998 to the Associated Press. It said, ? The CIA? s ignorance, incompetency, as good as its haughtiness toward the 1,400 Cuban exiles it trained and equipped to mount the invasion, was responsible for the debacle. The pick was between retreat without award and a gamble between black licking and doubtful triumph. The bureau take to chance at quickly diminishing odds, misleading presidential functionaries, be aftering ill, utilizing faulty intelligence, and carry oning an open military operation beyond their capableness. The CIA undertaking went frontward under the hapless semblance of deniability. Officials had failed to rede the president at an appropriate clip, that success had become doubtful and to urge that the operation hence be canceled? ( Nelson, Craig 1 ) . Other factors he criticized were the absence of equal air screen, the jobs in keeping secretiveness and security, imperativeness leaks, and the political infighting among the expatriates who seemed more leery of one another than Castro ( Goode, Stephen 84 ) . In decision, did the authorities truly believe that a force of 1,500 work forces were any lucifer for Castro? s ground forces of 400,000? Did they believe that their program to assail was foolproof? Did they take clip to be after the onslaught, or were they excessively dying to throw out Castro that they left out of import inside informations? If they had stopped to inquire themselves these inquiries, it is likely that they would hold called off the whole thing. Bibliography ? Bay of Pigs. ? Encyclopedia Americana. 1998 edition. Bay of Pigs Revisited, The. Online. Internet. 10 Oct. 2000. Available hypertext transfer protocol: //www.eserver.org/history/bay-of-pigs.txt Finkelstein, Norman H. , Thirteen Days / Ninety Miles: The Cuban Missle Crisis. New York: Simon A ; Schuster Publications, 1994. Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. The Secret of the Cuban Missile Crisis: ? One Hell of A Gamble. ? New York: W.W. Norton A ; Company, 1997. Goode, Stephen. Central Intelligence Agency. New York: Franklin Watts Company, 1982. Nelson, Craig. ? CIA Report on Bay of Pigs Released. ? The Associated Press News Service 21 Feb. 1998: 1 # 8211 ; 2. Robinson, Linda. ? The Price of Military Folly. ? U.S. News and World Report. 22 April 1996: 53 # 8211 ; 56.